We examine some assumptions about the nature of 'levels of reality' in the light of examples drawn from physics. Three central assumptions of the standard view of such levels (for instance, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) are (i) that levels are populated by entities of varying complexity, (ii) that there is a unique hierarchy of levels, ranging from the very small to the very large, and (iii) that the inhabitants of adjacent levels are related by the parthood relation. Using examples from physics, we argue that it is more natural to view the inhabitants of levels as the behaviors of entities, rather than entities themselves. This suggests an account of reduction between levels, according to which one behavior reduces to another if the two are related by an appropriate limit relation. By considering cases where such inter-level reduction fails, we show that the hierarchy of behaviors differs in several respects from the standard hierarchy of entities. In particular, while on the standard view, lower-level entities are 'micro' parts of higher-level entities, on our view, a system's macro-level behavior can be seen as a ('non-spatial') part of its micro-level behavior. We argue that this second hierarchy is not really in conflict with the standard view and that it better suits examples of explanation in science.
establish the ordering and the nature of the levels. But clearly, given the importance of this picture, more should be said and more precise characterizations should be given of how we identify different levels, what populates them (objects, properties, facts, …) , what principles govern the hierarchy of layers, and how widely any particular account of levels is supposed to be applicable. Finally, if there are many different layer schemes, many different ways of ordering things into hierarchies of levels, we need to ask in what sense all of these hierarchies can coexist: If conflicts appear, so that one object or property counts as 'higher' than another according to one ordering but 'lower' according to another, we might wonder whether one hierarchy or ordering is genuine and the others merely convenient, or indeed whether all hierarchies have no ontological significance and are merely different modes of representing an un-layered reality. 1 In this paper we address these questions from the standpoint of (classical) physics where levels-e.g., micro and macro levels-play an important role in the formulation of theories and explanations. We try to give an impression of the typical features of the hierarchies, ordering principles, and population of levels and how they contrast with widely used philosophical schemes, in particular, the Oppenheim-Putnam (OP) picture of layers of reality. We argue that there are a variety of possible hierarchies of levels in physics, and that these are ontologically significant, and that they are best understood 'non-reductively': higher-level phenomena in physics do not always reduce to lower-level phenomena.
Since our discussion remains entirely within the realm of physics, it won't give us any immediate insight into the more general issue of how higher-level phenomenasuch as mental or biological phenomena-relate to the physical. But it is perhaps not too far fetched to suggest that the relations between levels in physics may teach us something about how supposedly nonphysical levels might connect with their physical basis. For instance, we can imagine a form of nonreductive physicalism that holds that all the facts are physical facts, but adds that there are ontologically distinct levels of physical facts not related by reduction. 2 This differs from more common definitions of physicalism, such as 'All facts supervene on the physical facts.' The latter allows for nonphysical facts (e.g., 'mental' facts) as long as they are tied closely enough to the physicals facts. In our view, such an account gives up on the spirit of physicalism by admitting the existence of nonphysical facts. But insisting that all facts are physical needn't imply that there is only one true level of reality, nor that higher-level theories cannot be autonomous from lower-level ones. Our account of levels will show how this is possible.
The Oppenheim-Putnam hierarchy
Our project is to present an account of levels that is justified by the practice of physics. In examining the concept of levels, we aim to adhere to the same sort of principle that OP cite in what has become the most prominent account of levels in philosophy, viz., that [the] levels must be selected in a way which is 'natural' and justifiable from the standpoint of present-day empirical science. In particular, the step from any one of our reductive levels to the next lower level must correspond to what is …a crucial step in the trend toward overall physicalistic reduction. (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, p. 6) The resulting account of levels that OP offered goes as follows. The hierarchy of levels is a hierarchy of sets of entities corresponding to the universes of discourse for different branches of science. This hierarchy is arranged so that the branch of science dealing with level i is a 'potential micro-reducer' of the branch of science dealing with the next highest level i + 1 in that the entities from the higher level can be decomposed into entities at the lower level (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, p. 6) . It is further stipulated that any whole that's exhaustively decomposable into parts belonging to level i also belongs to i; thus, the population at each level includes all entities at higher levels. The hierarchy of layers is therefore ontologically conservative in the sense that moving up in the ordering does not add any ingredients to the world: all entities are already contained in the bottom layer, the level described by the most basic theories in physics.
Reductions between the branches of science associated with different levels are to be achieved by finding 'micro-reductions' between the theories constituting those branches. For a theory H to be micro-reducible to a theory L , three main conditions must be met. First, the associated branches of science must stand in the appropriate 'potential micro-reducer' relation: the entities in the domain of discourse of H must be composed of those in the domain of L . Second, whatever observational phenomena can be explained by H must also be explainable by L . Note that there is no requirement for any systematic connection between these explanations: unlike Nagelian reductions, 3 for example, micro-reductions require no bridge principles connecting the terms of one theory to those of the other. Finally, L must be of greater 'systematic power' than H . The latter clause means, roughly, that L must explain more or explain more efficiently than H (cf. Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952) .
This view of levels has its attractions. Generating the hierarchy by adding parts to form wholes which serve as parts for higher-level wholes, etc., leads to some seemingly plausible consequences: entities increase in spatial extension as we move up the hierarchy, and the ordering seems to correspond nicely with widespread views about different sciences dealing with entities of different 'complexity'. There are, however, two significant drawbacks to this account. 4 The first drawback is that the structure of the hierarchy of levels itself is determined prior to any specific empirical investigation: we posit the hierarchy based on our intuitions about the appropriate relations-in this case, part-whole relationsbetween the entities in the universes of discourse of different sciences. This seems 3 Cf. Nagel (1961) . 4 For a discussion of some other difficulties for the OP account, see Kim (2002). to get the order of discovery wrong: to construct a hierarchy which is 'natural' and 'justifiable' from the standpoint of empirical science, we should begin with scientific theories and derive the hierarchical structure from them. It's true that the levels OP describe are empirically justified in the limited sense that they consist of entities from the universes of discourse of different branches of science. However, the relationships between the levels themselves are not derived from any scientific theories. And it's not unreasonable to expect that they should be: after all, on the OP account all entities are described by the theories of physics, and so one might naturally expect that if any further division of entities into distinct levels is to be empirically justified, it should be justified by the theories of physics. But no appeal to such theories plays any role in drawing the OP distinctions.
The second difficulty concerns the concept of micro-reduction. One worry about this account of reduction is that it has little to do with reductions as they are conceived of in science (cf., e.g., Sklar 1967) . Furthermore-and this is particularly interesting to us -a failure of micro-reduction in a given case does not allow us to draw ontological conclusions about the entities at different levels. At best, successful micro-reductions have the extreme ontological consequence of eliminating the objects in the domain of the reduced theory-a consequence that classical reductionists were often at pains to reject (see, for instance, Hempel 1966, p. 78) . As we will show, a lot more can be learned from such failures in science than the OP framework allows.
These unsatisfactory aspects of the OP view motivate our exploration of an alternative account. Since reducibility is supposed to be an empirical hypothesis, an account of levels should tell us something about what ontological conclusions we can draw if reduction succeeds and, in particular, if it fails. In fact, this sort of evidence may well be the only support we have for making ontological claims, such as claims about part-whole relations, in the first place. Once we take this stance, we cannot postulate, e.g., part-whole relations between lower and higher level theories independently of looking at the way reductions of the latter to the former work or fail. To do that, we need to begin with an account of reduction that does not presuppose a part-whole relation between the things described by lower and higher level theories. In the following section, we will present an example of a simple physical system involving lower and higher level theories and investigate how these are related. We will see that there is more than one way of defining a hierarchical order of levels, each way providing insight into the ontological relations between the populations of the levels.
Hierarchies and levels: a view from physics
When physicists talk about levels, they often do not have in mind a mereological ordering of entities. Instead, what they describe is best understood as a stratification of reality into processes or behaviours at different scales. To describe a system's behaviour at a particular scale, we first specify a set of equations that represent the relevant features of the system at that scale. It is then the solutions to those equations-for instance, the integration of an equation over some time interval-that describe the behaviour of the system on that scale. Note that 'behaviour' is understood very broadly here as the distribution of properties of a system over space and/or time. These properties may include the position and momentum of (components of) the system-that is, the classical phase space portrait of the system-but they may include other sorts of properties as well. A system's behaviour can be associated with a variety of distinct types of scale: depending on the system, it is possible to have spatial, temporal, energy, momentum, or particle number scales, among others. Since scales are quantified, they give rise to a natural ordering or hierarchy of behaviours (at least among scales of a particular type-spatial scales, for example).
To illustrate consider the treatment of steady state heat conduction in a one-dimensional rod of length L. 5 This system is described in terms of its temperature T(x) and its thermal conductivity K(x) which both depend on the spatial variable x. We assume there to be no heat sources. At both ends of the rod (x = 0 and x = L) the temperature is held constant at some values. The equation for heat conservation in this system is
which tells us that the heat flux at any point in the rod (= K(x) dT(x)/dx) is constant. Equation 1 represents the macro scale theory of the rod. On this representation, we assume that the rod is a continuous structure and hence that conductivity only varies slowly with position. The temperature distribution in the rod at the macro level is represented by solutions to (1). The micro scale behaviour of the heated rod is governed by the following equation for heat conservation:
Superficially, this seems almost indistinguishable from the macro equation (1). However there is an important difference. On the micro scale, we assume a discrete, 'atomistic' constitution of the rod, that is, we stipulate that the system consists of individual 'atoms', separated by empty space-a periodic lattice with a period of length = L, with 1. On the micro scale, conductivity is a rapidly oscillating function of position: high around the location of each atom, low in the interatomic spaces. This is indicated by writing the conductivity k as a function of x and x/ . The dependence on x/ manifests itself as rapid variations because d/dx(k(x/ )) is proportional to 1/ , that is, the derivative of k is large for small .
The question now is: how do the behaviours of the system (i.e., the temperature distributions) at the micro and macro scale, represented by the solutions of (2) and (1), relate to each other? Physicists investigate this by considering various limit operations on the descriptions of the lower level behaviour. For instance, the solutions to the equations describing the system's behaviour on the lower level can be written in terms of a parameter that represents a real physical quantity (typically, a ratio between two features of the system), that is sufficiently small to be considered negligible on the higher level. By considering these solutions as the parameter value tends to the appropriate limit, we can hope to derive the consequences on the higher level of a system's behaviour on the lower level. The intuitive idea of such a 'limit reduction' is that if the lower level behaviour of a system can be described in terms of a parameter that is small enough to be negligible on the higher level, then we should be able to discover the higher level consequences of that lower level behaviour by examining the solutions to the lower level equations in the limit as that parameter value goes to zero. In a successful reduction, we would show that the higher level behaviour coincides with that limiting behaviour: the limit relation makes mathematical sense of the idea that the observed higher level behaviour is what we should expect to observe, given the postulated behaviour on the lower level. On the other hand, a failure of reduction would show that the higher level behaviour is not just what we would expect, given the lower level behaviour.
We can define this relation of limit reduction more formally as follows. 6 First, we define limit reduction for theories: A higher-level theory H reduces to a lower-level theory L iff the solutions of the equations of L , L (x), uniformly converge towards the solutions of the equations of H , H (x), in the limit of an appropriate parameter. 7 Remembering that solutions such as L (x) and H (x) describe behaviours, we can then say that one behaviour reduces to another iff there are theories governing those behaviours that stand in the relation of limit reduction.
The limit notion of reduction has several attractive features. First, it is an asymmetric relation, as a genuinely ontological concept of reduction should be: in general, if 6 For earlier discussions of this concept of reduction see Nickles (1973) and Batterman (1995) . Nickles is primarily interested in contrasting limit reductions, such as the reduction of Special Relativity to Newtonian mechanics in the limit of low velocities (i.e., as v/c → 0), with reductions between theories dealing with distinct domains. Despite this suggested contrast, it is clear that limit relations are essential to the sort of reductions that have interested metaphysicians and philosophers of science. For example, the paradigmatic case of 'domain expanding' ontological reduction in science is the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and the (arguably) consequent identification of 'temperature' with some form of mean kinetic energy. Mathematically, this reduction is achieved in the limit of infinite particle number and volume (N, V → ∞) with the density (N/V) held constant. Thus while limit reduction may be characteristic of 'domain preserving' reductions of the sort Nickles describes, it is also essential to the 'domain expanding' reductions of the sort that interest us here. 7 Note that uniformity of the limit (rather than merely point-wise convergence) is an important feature of limit reduction. Assume that we are interested in the limit of (x) when the parameter → 0. To investigate the problem we write (x) as an expansion in terms of the small parameter:
uniformly means that if we take the functions (x) = 0 (x) + 1 (x) + · · · as parameterized by and consider the sequence of such functions for > 0, we require that for all x and for all choices of d > 0, there is an and a δ so that | (x) − 0 (x)| < d whenever < δ. In other words, in the case of uniform convergence of (x) towards 0 (x), we can always find a small number d so that all (x)-functions (with < δ) stay within a distance d from the limit function 0 (x)-for all x (i.e., δ does not depend on x). This uniformity is obviously an intuitively desirable property of the reduction relation; it is more demanding than point-wise convergence where we allow different choices of δ for different x within the domain of the theory. If the limit of (x) is not uniform (but rather 'singular'), that is, if for some x lim →0 (x) = 0 (x), the functions (x), at some values of x, do not stay within the chosen d-region around the limit function theory H reduces to theory L in the limit of parameter , then L will not also reduce to H . That's because the effect of the limit operation is typically to remove the relevant parameter, so that 'reduced' theories are in some sense simplified versions of reducing theories. 8 Second, limit reduction is non-trivial in that whether or not one theory reduces to another is an empirical question that can only be answered by investigating limit relations between those theories. Finally, the most attractive feature of limit reduction for our purposes is that it is the inter-theoretic relation that's actually used in physics. To see if the macro scale behaviour of the rod reduces to its micro scale behaviour, we need to investigate (2) in the limit as = /L → 0. This 'continuum limit' reflects the intuitive requirement that the macroscopic representation should 'smooth out' the details found at the micro scale. Our hope is that in this limit (2) will no longer contain the rapidly varying k(x, x/ ) but instead a slowly varying macro conductivity K(x).
To investigate this limit, we consider a perturbation expansion of the solutions of (2) in terms of the small parameter = /L. Since we interested in whether or not solutions T m to (2) uniformly converge on solutions T M to (1) as → 0, we first construct an expansion of the form:
We then try to derive the macro scale consequences of T m by considering the limit as → 0. If things go well, the additional terms in (3) will drop away in this limit, and we'll be left with the expected macro scale behaviour, T M .
It turns out, though, that this approach doesn't work. Letting the parameter go to zero results in more and more rapid oscillations of the coefficient k(x, x/ ), and hence of T m (x). In general, T m (x) will show a 'singular' dependence on . In general-that is, unless k(x, x/ ) is chosen in special ways-the solution T m (x) will not converge uniformly to T M (x) in the limit → 0. That is, we have
T m (x) and T M (x) differ considerably, even for the smallest nonzero values of the parameter. T M (x) is not reducible to T m (x). 8 The asymmetry of limit reduction might be masked by the fact that, as Nickles (1973) points out, philosophers and physicists seem to identify the direction of reduction differently. According to Nickles, reduction in "the philosopher's sense" goes from the less basic to the more basic theory, so that 0 reduces to if 0 can be derived from . The "physicists' sense" of reduction, by contrast, says that reduces to 0 if the limit of (in an appropriate parameter) is 0 ; here, reduction goes from the more basic to the less basic theory. Our definition of reduction adheres to the philosophers' custom of identifying the direction of reduction as from the less basic to the more basic, though we exploit the limit concept in explaining this relation. It's true that whenever theory 0 reduces to theory in our sense, theory will reduce to theory 0 in "the physicists' sense". But this is simply the result of a convention about how philosophers and physicists speak of reduction. In both cases, the important underlying fact is that one theory is a special case of the other-and philosophers and physicists agree on the nature of this relation. For example, Newtonian mechanics is a special case of Special Relativity: philosophers call that the reduction of NM to SR while physicists call it the reduction of SR to NM-but neither claim that Special Relativity is a special case of Newtonian mechanics.
This result means that our attempt to derive the macro scale consequences of the rod's micro scale behaviour has failed. Not only did we not get the macro behaviour we were hoping for, the singularity of the limit means that as → 0, T m (x) doesn't give us any description of the macro behaviour at all. So we're still looking for a way to derive the macro scale consequences of the micro behaviour so that these can be compared with the macro theoretic description.
Fortunately, in many cases where limit reduction fails, one can still construct an expansion that gives a uniformly valid approximation of T m in terms of T M . Such expansions will usually only be asymptotic, not convergent: if we truncate the expansion after only a few terms, we get a good approximation of T m , but continually adding more terms to the expansion does not necessarily give us a better approximation. The way to do this is to explicitly introduce two length scales in the micro description, the macroscopic scale x and a microscopic scale y = x/ . 9 Thus, we consider an asymptotic expansion of T m as a function of two independent variables:
where we now have to replace in (2) the derivative d/dx with ∂/∂ x +(1/ )∂/∂ y because we treat x and y as independent. We then substitute expansion (4) into this transformed version of (2) and attempt to solve for the various T i s under the constraint that the higher-order terms in the expansion should not grow too quickly: it is this constraint that guarantees that the approximation will remain asymptotically valid, unlike in our initial attempt to solve for T in terms of only one variable. This procedure gives us
where
is indeed independent of the microscopic variations measured by y; it depends only on the macro level position x, as a macro level quantity should. But it also shows that the solution of (2) cannot be written in terms of the macro scale position x alone; the higher order terms like T 1 (x, y) will contain both scales. Furthermore, it turns out that in order to guarantee that series (5) is asymptotic, we have to impose (at order ) a so-called 'solvability condition' on (5). This condition, remarkably, is precisely the macroscopic heat conduction equation we are trying to recover from the micro equation (2). The macro equation, thus, arises as a necessary constraint that has to be imposed on the micro-level description of the behaviour of our system:
is the 'effective' macro conductivity-a sort of average over the micro conductivity but not the simple arithmetic mean of k(x, y) over the length of the rod that one might have expected. This procedure, which is known as 'multi-scaling' or 'homogenization', 10 is widely used in deriving the macro scale consequences of micro scale behaviour in cases where a system is characterized by structures or processes operating on significantly different scales.
We want to defend two claims drawn from this example. The first is that this is a clear example where macro behaviour does not reduce to micro behaviour: though we have succeeded in deriving some macro scale consequences of the micro behaviour, these do not coincide with the behaviour described by the macro theory. However, the second claim is that this irreducibility does not mean that the macro behaviour is entirely distinct from the micro behaviour, either. The result of the process-Eq. 5-shows us their relationship. Equation 5-when fleshed out with the constraints imposed for solvability-gives us a description of the macro scale consequences of the micro scale behaviour. T M (x), the description of the 'pure' macro scale behaviour, is a crucial part of that description: it is the leading term in the expansion. We conclude that, rather than the macro being in some way composed of the micro behaviour, the situation is the reverse: the macro is part of the micro. That's what a literal reading of the expansion Eq. 5 indicates: T M (x) is part of T m (x, y). 11 The behaviour of the heated 10 Technically, homogenization is just one type of multi-scaling. To 'homogenize', we begin with a micro theoretic account that describes a system as components with different properties (in our simple example, the 'mixture' involves atoms and the spaces separating them. More sophisticated examples might involve mixtures of a variety of substances with different properties). We then homogenize this mixture by averaging out the properties characteristic of the details on the small scale and hope to get the properties exhibited on the macro scale. 11 It might seem arbitrary to interpret an equation like
as representing a part-whole relation in which T(x) is the whole. The equation itself is symmetric in the sense that we can just as well write
so that it looks as if T 0 (x) might be the whole and T(x) a component. But there is no arbitrariness here. Although the equations are symmetric, the asymmetry required for our interpretation is introduced by the perturbation approach itself. We are looking for a representation of the system's (total) behaviour, an appropriate solution of the equations of motion, which is T(x). T 0 (x), by contrast, solves the equations of motion only approximately, at the lowest order (e.g., 0 ) of the perturbation theory; the complete solution is T(x) and therefore we are justified in interpreting T(x) as the whole and T 0 (x) as a component.
rod, the distribution of temperature over the length of the system, consists of several components, one of which is the purely macro behaviour T M (x). This is a clear and somewhat surprising ontological consequence of the failure of reduction. One further consequence of this result is that it suggests the possibility of alternative hierarchies of levels, one where phenomena are ordered according to scale and another where those same phenomena are ordered according to the part-whole relation. According to the standard account of levels, those two hierarchies should coincide, but in the case we've described here they are distinct hierarchies that order phenomena in opposite directions. We'll examine these alternative hierarchies after considering some possible objections to the claims we've just made.
A reductionist response
First, note that nothing in the mathematical procedure of multi-scaling or homogenization forces us to conclude that the macro behaviour is part of the micro behaviour. It's a general feature of descriptions and explanations in science that they don't wear their ontological commitments on their sleeves: all anyone can do is to argue that a particular account makes the best sense of a particular theory or procedure. Doing this typically involves showing that one account is more compelling than its rivals, and that it faces no intrinsic difficulties. So let's consider some reductionist interpretations of the situation.
One reductionist response would be to say that-despite our inability to find a convergent derivation-the macro scale behaviour still reduces to the micro scale behaviour: on this view, finding a successful limit relation is regarded simply as an open project. This is a consistent attitude: we haven't proven that no such relation can be found. However, on the only practical way of asking the question of how they relate, the macro scale behaviour does not reduce to the micro scale behaviour.
Alternatively, the reductionist could agree that the macro scale behaviour described by T M (x)-i.e., the solution to (1)-does not reduce to the micro scale behaviour, but argue that simply shows that T M (x) is an inaccurate description of the macro behaviour: she could simply insist that the true description of the macro behaviour is that which comes from an exact, not approximate, solution of the micro theory. Such a view, however, depends on some assumptions that are not yet justified by scientific practice. First, we don't have an exact solution to the micro theory: we only have a well-behaved approximation. Since we don't have that exact solution, we haven't shown that we can extract a more accurate description of the macro behaviour from it: we've simply assumed that we must be able to. Showing this would involve investigating a limit relation of some sort, and we've just seen that the results of such operations can't be taken for granted. So the reductionist view requires quite a bit of faith. Perhaps it is defensible that the metaphysical insistence on reduction should trump scientific failures of reduction. But we are interested in exploring the alternative route, viz., taking the scientific successes and failures seriously and searching for a metaphysical view that harmonizes with them. After all, through the solvability condition on expansion (5), the macro scale description plays an important role in finding a useful approximation of the micro scale description of the system: it is difficult to see what unbiased reason we could find for simply ignoring this role. Accordingly, we take the failure of reduction seriously, and we accept the reality of both the macro behaviour and the micro behaviour. But these behaviours are not entirely distinct; their relation is one of part to whole. 12
Parts and powers
Perhaps the claim that macro behaviour is part of micro behaviour sounds objectionable: if anything, we might think, the parthood claim should be the other way around, since it is smaller (micro) things that are part of larger (macro) things. However, this is not the only way of understanding the parthood relation.
When we consider the parts of entities, we normally expect parts to be smaller than, and spatially contained within, whatever 'whole' they compose. Call this familiar sense of parthood spatial parthood. Obviously, the macro behaviour is not a spatial part of the system's behaviour. But the spatial sense is not the only way to think about parthood (cf. McGivern 2005) . There are a variety of senses of 'parthood' that do not imply a particular spatial relation between parts and wholes. As Lewis (1991, p. 75f.) points out, the part-whole relation can hold between things not plausibly thought of as being situated in space or time, as when we say that trigonometry is part of mathematics. And we can also conceive of a (proper) parthood relation holding between things that are situated in space and time. Lewis suggests, for example, that it is conceivable that the component quarks of a proton exactly overlap it (and each other) in space and time. Whatever other physical or metaphysical reasons we may have for rejecting such a possibility, nothing in mereology alone rules it out. Similarly, nothing in mereology alone entails that one pattern of behavior can only be part of another if the first is in some (spatial) sense 'smaller than' the second: mereologically, there is no problem in claiming that a system's macro behavior is part of its total behavior.
What can it mean, however, to say that one behaviour is part of another? It might mean that one behavior occurs during an interval of time properly included in the interval during which another behavior occurs, as when my lifting my arm is part of my hailing a cab; but that isn't the sense of parthood involved here: the macro behavior occurs simultaneously with the total behavior of the rod. Alternatively, it might mean that one behavior is the behavior of part of whatever entity is exhibiting the whole behavior, as when we distinguish between the left-hand and right-parts of a piano composition; but that also isn't the sense of parthood involved here: the macro behavior is not the behavior of part of the rod, though it is part of the rod's behavior.
If we had a well-accepted definition of the parthood relation in general, then presumably we could give a satisfying answer to the question of what it means for the macro behaviour to be part of the micro behaviour by simply showing that the behaviours meet that definition; but we know of no such definition. However, there is a prominent view of parthood in the philosophy of mind that can be applied to our case as well. Shoemaker and others have suggested that the 'realization' relationship between a supervenient property and its realizer should be understood as a type of parthood relation between properties: realized properties are parts of their realizers. 13 This idea is then explicated in terms subset relation between causal powers: the causal powers of realized properties form a subset of those of their realizing properties. 14 In our case, the corresponding claim needs to be that the causal powers of the macro behaviour are a subset of those of the micro behaviour.
The subset view of realization has also been used to characterize the difference between properties that are reducible and those that are not (cf. Wilson 1999) . In cases of successful reduction, the causal powers of the realized property form an improper subset of the powers associated with the realizing property; the sets are identical. In cases where reduction fails, by contrast, the powers of the realized property are a proper subset of the set of powers of the realizing property. In the latter case, it follows that the realizing and realized properties are distinct. This view fits nicely with our example. In the case of successful limit reduction, the macro scale consequences of the micro behaviour coincide with the macro theoretic description of the system's behaviour: this corresponds to the claim that the causal powers associated with the realizing property coincide with those of the realized property. In cases where reduction fails, the macro scale consequences of the micro behaviour can only be approximately described, where this approximation is constructed as an expansion around the macro theoretic description and is only achieved by explicitly distinguishing macro and micro processes: this corresponds to the claim that the causal powers associated with the realized property form a proper subset of those of the realizing property. 15 At this point, the following worry arises. If the causal powers of the macro behaviour form a subset of those of the micro behaviour, then in what sense can the macro behaviour ever be a genuine cause, given that it is always (presumably) realized by some micro behaviour or other? Heil (1999, p.194f ) puts this in terms of the causal 13 See Shoemaker (2001, 78ff ) (with further references). Compare also Yablo (1992) .
14 One of the attractions of the subset view is that, as Lewis 1991 notes, the subset relation satisfies the standard axioms of mereology. For instance, understanding mereological fusion in terms of set-theoretic union, and borrowing Lewis' characterization of those axioms: Transitivity: "if x is part of some part of y, then x is part of y" → "if X is a subset of some subset of Y, then X is a subset of Y" Unrestricted composition: "whenever there are some things, then there exists a fusion of those things" → "for every collection of sets there is a set that is their union" Uniqueness of composition: "it never happens that the same things have two different fusions" → "it never happens that the same sets have two different unions" In each case the set-theoretic claim is clearly true. Of course, this doesn't show that the parthood relation must be understood in terms of subsets of causal powers, but it does show that understanding it in this way is consistent with mereology. 15 One prominent objection to our parthood claim accepts that parthood doesn't necessarily involve spatial containment, but still rejects the claim on the grounds that if the components in an expansion such as Eq. 4 are treated as descriptions of real parts, then similar parthood claims must be true of similar expansions. For instance, the objection goes, shouldn't similar conclusions be drawn about parts of force vectors, velocity vectors, Fourier expansions, and the like? The objection is that such a conclusion would be absurd, and hence the original parthood claim about macro behavior must be false. powers of the realizer "swallowing up" those of the realized property: if the behaviours relate as part to whole, can't everything that's done by the part also be done by the whole so that there is no distinctive causal role for the part? This worry has obvious affinities with arguments from Kim and others that subvenient properties exclude supervenient properties from playing any causal role. And since a common (and reasonable) constraint on ontological claims-at least for physical systems and properties-is that what is real should be causally efficacious, or at least potentially so, we need to be able to identify the unique causal role played by the macro level behaviour if we are to defend the claim that these levels of behaviour can be regarded as ontologically real.
This sort of worry also arises in discussions of the reality of components more generally, such as a component force of gravitation, where it is sometimes argued that components can play no causal role not already played by whatever resultant they partly compose. 16 Although various attempts have been made to defend the reality of component forces, the burden of proof in our case seems to be distributed differently. We have already accepted the irreducibility of the macro behaviour to the purely microscopic behaviour: the reality of the macro level behaviour is therefore not the primary issue. Instead, the question is whether this macro behaviour is causally efficacious in a sense that's distinguishable from the causal efficacy of the micro behaviour. Here, we can avail ourselves of an account of causation given by Yablo, which requires genuine causes to be commensurate or proportional to their effects (Yablo 1992, p. 434f.) . Causal commensurateness requires a property (or event) C to be both sufficient and required for property or event E in order to count as its cause. The sufficiency condition, if satisfied by C, is also satisfied by any C * such that C is a part of C * . However, if C is required for E, then any C * * that is a part of C will not be sufficient for E. Intuitively, some property instances are sufficient to bring about an effect E but contain more detail than required for causing E; other property instances, although causally relevant for E, contain insufficient detail to cause E. The cause of E strikes the balance and is therefore proportional to the effect.
To illustrate: An alarm bell goes off (E) if a certain temperature (T) is reached. Suppose E occurs. Suppose we could specify the microscopic state of the air and the measuring device-a large conjunction of state descriptions of individual molecules-so as to characterize the cause of E. This, according to Yablo's view, would be a candidate cause that clearly contains too much "causally extraneous detail"; although sufficient for E, it would not qualify as the cause of E because many other micro states of the air and the apparatus (other realizations of T) would also have brought Footnote 15 continued Perhaps such a general conclusion about vector components and parthood is absurd, but there is an important disanalogy between these other cases and expansion (4). In our case, the component, the macro behaviour, is to be understood as 'realized' by the whole, the micro (or mixed) behaviour. The latter, represented by T(x, y), is the 'basis' of the macro behaviour, a behavior that doesn't exist on its own but only in virtue of the basis' existence. In other words, the macro supervenes on the micro behavior-a condition that is not satisfied in the case of vector components and resultants. The resultant vector does not realize the component in any plausible sense and the component does not supervene on the resultant: a change in the latter does not necessitate a change in the component. 16 For a review cf. McGivern (2005, p. 156ff) . about E. That the air has reached T, however, qualifies as the cause because this event is sufficient for E and it is required-it contains just enough detail for E. Lastly, quoting the presence of air as E's cause "omits factors critical to [E's] occurrence", although air is causally relevant for E.
Applied to our case of macro and micro behaviour, the proportionality requirement for causes tells us that, depending on the effect we are interested in, T m (x, y) will sometimes be the cause but for other choices of effect we'll have to select T M (x) in order to satisfy proportionality of cause and effect. The nonuniform limit which leads from T m (x, y) to T M (x) is a procedure for isolating that part of the microscopic behaviour that is causally efficacious at the macro level, i.e., the part which can satisfy the proportionality requirement for macro causes (cf. Rueger 2004). In general, the limit → 0, which is supposed to take us to the macro level, can be understood as the means by which we arrive, starting from the causally sufficient micro behaviour at the causally sufficient and required, that is, commensurate, macro behaviour. As we have seen, in our example the limit can be taken (approximately) successfully only if we introduce an independent macro scale besides the micro scale. It is tempting to characterize this method as stripping away or eliminating "causally extraneous [microscopic] detail"-if it were not for the danger of being misunderstood: The continuum limit does not change the system, as given by the microscopic description of the rod; it does not really switch to the description of an altogether different system and its behaviour. The limit operation rather isolates a part of the behaviour of the given system. This is important to emphasize because recently Thalos (2006, p. 168ff ) has criticized a related attempt to interpret the relation between micro and macro systems in terms of renormalization group techniques by claiming that talk about "elimination of degrees of freedom" or of "micro details" has no clear ontological meaning because it seems to imply a distortion of the actual system. 17 Our view is that the limit procedures are not to be seen as distortions of a given system's behaviour but rather as ways of identifying a structure within the given behaviour-that part of the micro level (or mixed) behaviour that corresponds to the macro level behaviour. So the entire system's behaviour is 'more than' pure macro behaviour; but the macro component is to be found within the system's behaviour. The worry about the macro behaviour not having a causal role distinguishable from that of the micro behaviour-Heil's worry about the causal powers of the former being "swallowed up" by those of the latter-can now be countered by pointing out the macro behaviour's causal efficacy: for certain effects, the macro behaviour cannot be replaced by the micro behaviour as the genuine cause.
Alternative hierarchies of levels
In Sect. 1, we argued that a deficiency in OP's account of levels was that their notion of reduction did not have any ontological consequences; that is, from the fact that a theory H reduces to L alone, they cannot infer that therefore the objects of H stand in such-and-such ontological relations to the objects of L . Such relations have to be established or postulated independently. Our aim, by contrast, was to use the success or failure of theory reductions to make ontological claims plausible. We have now arrived at such a claim concerning the part-whole relation of macro and micro behaviour.
This introduces a second ordering principle for hierarchies of levels, in addition to the ordering based on spatial scale. To understand this new ordering properly, we first note that the asymptotic approximation we derive from the micro theory, represented by T m (x, y) in Eq. 5, contains a curious mixture of micro and macro scales: since the expansion contains variables (x and y) represented both scales, it appears that the usual hierarchy of spatial scales has broken down or is otherwise useless. In the face of this problem, we have two choices: (A) Although we accept nonreducibility of macro to micro behaviour, we do not take the mixed solution seriously but regard it as an approximation to the solution of the micro equations, a substitute for a purely microscopic solution which we are unable to obtain. So, in effect, we treat T m (x, y), despite the fact that it depends on both scales, as if it represented a solution at the micro scale only. (B) Alternatively, we take the mixed solution seriously as a description of the behaviour of the system that is indeed composed of ingredients from both scales. Call T m (x, y) the 'total' behavior of the system. From the point of view of the part-whole ordering, the macro behavior would be located at the lower level, the total behaviour at the higher level.
But isn't there a serious problem now? On interpretation (A), the two orderings seem to give inconsistent results with respect to the same behaviours: in terms of spatial scales, the macro behaviour should be 'higher' in the hierarchy than the micro behaviour (represented by T m (x, y)); in terms of parts and wholes, the whole, T m (x, y), should be 'higher' than T M (x), one of the parts. Doesn't the existence of two inconsistent level hierarchies constitute evidence against an ontological reading of what populates the levels? Is our case perhaps similar to the 'incompatible models argument' against scientific realism 18 and do we have reached a result that provides an argument against understanding the populations of the levels realistically?
The incompatible models argument claims that a realist attitude towards models in science is mistaken because scientists routinely and successfully employ models of one and the same natural system which are incompatible with respect to the properties they assign to the real system. Given such inconsistent attributions, models should obviously not be interpreted realistically. (Let's grant, for the sake of conciseness, that this argument is acceptable.) The analogous argument in the case of hierarchies of levels would be: Since the pair of behaviours, T m (x, y) and T M (x), are ordered in incompatible ways in the spatial scales and in the part-whole hierarchy, the behaviours should not both be taken as real but rather as different descriptions (from different points of view) of the real behaviour. 19 The analogy of the arguments, however, is only apparent and does not justify the anti-realist conclusion. What is significantly different in the levels case is the existence of two distinct ordering principles that underlie the hierarchies. There is no equivalent to this feature in the incompatible models argument. Compare the ordering of a set of objects according to a colour scale (say, red-yellow-blue) and according to size (large-small). This can, under easily imaginable circumstances, lead to incompatible hierarchies. There may be red objects, that is, high-colour level objects which come to populate the lower-size level, and so on. No concerns should arise from this fact regarding the reality of small red objects, etc. Since the ordering principles pick out different aspects or features of the objects, there is no incompatibility in this case analogous to the incompatibility in the models argument. Similarly for spatial scales and part-whole hierarchies of behaviours. The large-scale behaviour exists at a higher level than the small-scale behaviour in an ordering of spatial scales. But that's compatible with the former behaviour being a part in the latter if we spell out the part-whole relation in non-spatial terms as explained before. So the presupposed hierarchy of behaviours in terms of an increasing spatial scale does not get upset by the nonspatial part-whole relations between behaviours. The problem of inconsistent orderings would arise if we thought of the hierarchy in terms of objects of increasing spatial extension. A macro object, obviously, cannot be a (spatial) part of a micro object; the macroscopic heated rod is not a part of its microscopic constituents. But the macro behaviour can be contained, as a component structure, in the micro behaviour.
What if we adopt (B), the view that the behaviour described by T m (x, y) cannot be associated with only one scale? This behaviour does not really populate a definite level in a spatial scales hierarchy-but it still is an element in a part-whole hierarchy. Thus it is not quite correct to interpret the result of the multi-scale calculation as showing that the macro behaviour is a part of the micro behaviour; it is a part of the 'mixed' behaviour T m (x, y) which has no definite place in the micro-macro hierarchy. Since T m (x, y) cannot be ordered in terms of micro and macro spatial scales as lower than T M (x), there it is no inconsistency with the ordering of behaviours in terms of parts and wholes where T m (x, y) is higher than T M (x).
It is a common requirement of physicalism that the entities, properties, and behaviours at the micro scale are more fundamental than those found at the macro, and therefore that the former asymmetrically determine the latter (cf. e.g., Hüttemann and Papineau 2005) . It is plausible to read this as a claim about parts and wholes: the entities, properties and behaviours found at the micro scale are parts of those found at the macro scale; and the parts at the smaller scale asymmetrically determine both the entities and the behaviours found at the larger scale. Parts, on this view, are more fundamental than the wholes they constitute. But note that this part-whole reading of the claim that the micro population asymmetrically determines the macro population depends on the standard spatial notion of parthood. We have pointed out that in the case of behaviours an alternative, non-spatial sense of parthood is suggested by the analysis of the heated rod example. Using this notion of parthood, we find that the macro-scale behavior is a part of the micro-scale behavior. Since we do not revise the original fundamentality requirement that the micro asymmetrically determines the macro, it follows that, in this case, the whole (the micro behavior) determines the parts (the macro behavior). Thus, the view that what happens at the micro level determines the goings-on at the macro level and that the micro is more fundamental than the macro, can be translated into parts-wholes talk in two ways: (i) if we adopt a spatial notion of parthood, the parts determine the whole and the parts are more fundamental; (ii) if we use the non-spatial sense of parthood, the whole determines the parts-but without a commitment that the whole is more fundamental than the parts, since the original fundamentality requirement, which was formulated in terms of micro and macro scales, is still in place. Even though it may seem, at first glance, as if 'the whole determines the parts' represents a violation of the physicalist credo, this impression turns out to be mistaken when we keep in mind the different senses of parthood. The apparent paradox is created by combining a spatial sense of fundamentality with a non-spatial notion of parthood. (We leave it open whether this result indicates that the physicalist requirement of asymmetric determination should be reformulated.)
These considerations should be sufficient to respond to an objection that Batterman (2002, p.116 ) has leveled against a part-whole interpretation of the kind we propose. The case he discusses is different from ours but the basic features of his argument apply generally. He considers two theories that are supposed to account for the various features of rainbows, an optical theory operating with rays (geometric optics) and one based on a wave theory of light (wave optics). Can the ray-theoretic structure of a rainbow be understood as part of an overall wave-theoretic structure? That they could is suggested by the fact that solutions to the wave-theoretic equations can be constructed with a ray-theoretic component as their leading term. But Batterman argues that this attempt to read a part-whole relation into the equations would be misguided. While everybody agrees that the wave theory is more 'fundamental' than the ray theory, the suggested reading would have us regard ray-theoretic features as parts of wave-theoretic ones. This, Batterman thinks, violates a general principle about parthood: wholes cannot be more fundamental than their parts.
Such a principle seems unobjectionable, provided that we are clear about (i) the sense of parthood being considered, and (ii) the sense of fundamentality involved. In our case, we are considering a hierarchy ordered by a non-spatial parthood relation connecting micro and macro behaviors so that the macro behavior is part of the micro behavior. As we explained above, this is in line with the principle that the micro asymmetrically determines the macro if we understand fundamentality in a spatial sense. Were we to adopt a non-spatial sense of fundamentality, we could respect the requirement that parts are more fundamental than the whole: if we understand the claim about parthood between behaviours in terms of the subset relation between their associated causal powers-so that the causal powers of the macro behaviour form a subset of those of the micro behaviour-we can accommodate the principle that parts are more fundamental than wholes in the sense that if X is a subset of Y, then X is more fundamental than Y.
Conclusion
The hierarchy of layers that arises from the scientific practice we discussed differs in several respects from the original OP hierarchy. The hierarchy, first of all, is a sequence of behaviours rather than objects; and it seems doubtful that an ordering of objects can really be extracted from the sort of equations we looked at. Second, the hierarchy of behaviours at different scales is not ordered according to spatial part-whole relations; instead the only apparent part-whole relation is the non-spatial parthood relation that in fact runs in the opposite direction to the ordering of scales. Should the hierarchy of behaviours then be called a sequence of layers or levels at all? This is a terminological question: if one feels that the notion of layer or level is unavoidably linked to spatial part-whole relations, then this label must appear inappropriate. But it is not obvious why the layered view of the world should be so intimately and exclusively associated with spatial relations between objects rather than with non-spatial relations between behaviours.
If we take attitude (B) towards T m (x, y), we cannot say-as we pointed out beforethat this behaviour belongs to either the micro or the macro level. This result, too, is surprising if we think in terms of the OP hierarchy. While the layered world that consists of entities at different levels seems to assign a level to every object one might think of, the hierarchy of behaviours at different scales is less inclusive. There are, obviously, behaviours that do not find a place in the micro-macro ordering. Thus it is not true that for any pair of behaviours we can say that one is 'higher' than the other in the spatial sense of ordering. 20 But although the spatial scales ordering may not be applicable anymore, the procedure for calculating T m (x, y) and T M (x) defines an alternative ordering in terms of parts and wholes. This alternative hierarchy, however, has still very little to do with the OP model because it is an ordering according to a non-spatial sense of parts and wholes.
It is tempting to give a further interpretation to the story we have told, an interpretation in terms of emergent behaviours. Traditionally, a necessary condition for behaviour (or properties or objects) to count as emergent has been their nonreducibility to some sort of more basic behaviour (properties, etc.) . This condition is satisfied by the macro behaviour displayed in our example. Furthermore, another traditional requirement for emergence, novelty of the emergent behaviour as compared to the more basic behaviour, can also be satisfied in cases of singular limit relations between the theories describing the behaviours. In such cases the nonreducible behaviour is qualitatively different from the more basic one in the sense that the phase space trajectory of the first system cannot be smoothly transformed (or deformed) into the trajectory of the second. This topological inequivalence of behaviours can plausibly be interpreted as capturing a sense of novelty (cf. Rueger 2000) .
Since it has become customary to distinguish between nonreductive physicalism and emergentism (as a form of property dualism), it is perhaps misleading to claim the label of emergence for the relation just characterized. Even worse, one might misunderstand the suggestion as support for Kim's charge that nonreductive physicalists are fooling themselves if they think that their position is different from emergentism (e.g., Kim 1998, p. 8f) . But attention to the setting of our examples and their interpretation should dispel any such suspicion. We tried to show that within the realm of established physics we can find models of a layered reality where behaviour at higher levels does not reduce to lower level behaviour. The behaviours-perfectly physical-are numerically distinct but necessarily related to each other, viz., as part to whole. That's nonreductive physicalism, as we defined it at the beginning.
